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A STRATEGY FOR UTILIZING NUCLEAR POWER
Edward J. Martens
Fitchburg State College
Fitchburg, Massachusetts

Abstract
One of our national goals is to achieve independence in the area of
energy supplies in the next few years. We believe that attaining
this goal will require extensive utilization of nuclear power in
conventional fission reactors. We propose that the best way to de
velop our nuclear resource is through government ownership of the
reactors. We argue that this will minimize the risks associated
with the nuclear power option and clear the way for its exploita-

1. INTRODUCTION

political problem.

One of the more significant developments
of the present decade has been the grow
ing awareness of the resource limitations
our society faces. Americans came pain
fully to grips with this problem with the
energy crisis of 1973-197^. The abrupt
realization that unlimited supplies of
cheap energy could no longer be relied on
brought action on several fronts. The
general public responded by adopting en
ergy conservation measures, some of its
own choosing and some mandated by govern
ment.
Policy planners proposed several
courses of action, one of which was to
achieve energy independence by 1980 (1 ).
The technical community took up the chal
lenge of developing and exploring energy
alternatives. We will propose here one
such alternative.

We also recognize and identify a long-term
problem. Our current primary energy sup
plies are fossil fuels. As implied by the
term fossil, it is generally accepted that
these supplies will diminish and disappear
sometime in the future. The precise tim
ing of this disappearance is a matter of
some dispute, the arguements revolving around consumption rates and reserves prin
cipally. But few people doubt that it
will occur. This we call the long-term
problem and its solution is to find per
manent replacements for the fossil fuels
we currently rely on. We note for either
problem that the technical solution is
clear. We must find alternative energy
supplies which are available and whose to
tal cost, economic, environmental, and
aesthetic, is acceptable to society at
large.

For this purpose we find it convenient to
separate the energy problem into two com
ponents. The first we call the near-term
problem characterized by the fact that
there is no absolute shortage of energy.
All the conventional sources society re
lies on are in adequate supply and the
problem, or crisis if you prefer, is pri
marily geopolitical in nature rather than
resource based.
We interpret achieving
energy independence as solving this geo

We concern ourselves here with the first
problem, the near-term problem as we have
defined it. We suggest that a much ex
panded nuclear energy program utilizing
conventional fission reactors represents
the best solution to this problem. In
fact such reactors have been producing
power commercially since 1957 and at one
time were regarded enthusiastically as the
energy source of the future. This enthu
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in oil and gas. It begins at 7.65 x 10^5
BTU in 1970.
In this year the shortfall
is essentially all in oil and represents
I. 32 x 109 bbl. By 2010 the shortfall has
risen to 112.2 x 10^-' BTU representing
II. 8 x 109 bbl of oil and 44 TCF of natural
gas. Subject to our assumptions these data
tell us the domestic energy supplies needed
to achieve independence. We can easily
convert these figures to capacity required
which rises from 256 x 103 MW in 1970 to
3750 x 103 MW in 2010. While the assump
tions can and should be questioned, the
data do indicate the magnitude of the prob
lem. A sizeable national effort will be
required to attain energy independence.

siasm has waned considerably as have the
fortunes of the reactor industry in the
ensuing years. Major technical and econ
omic problems have thoroughly dampened the
growth of nuclear power U.S. We propose
that government intervention in the form
of reactor ownership can minimize these
problems and make nuclear power the best
solution, if not the only solution, to our
near-term energy dilemma.
2.

THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

One of the major difficulties in quantita
tively analyzing energy alternatives is
predicting future energy needs. However,
such predictions are of great importance
and great efforts have been made to gen
erate them. Like all Delphic exercises
the difficulties are many and the results
somewhat unreliable. We will not deal
with these problems here but rather choose
a simple scenario to illustrate the magni
tude of the energy problem so we can eval
uate some of the energy alternatives available to us.

3.

THE OPTIONS

Domestic energy sources which could possi
bly be used to attain energy independence
are many; coal, solar, geothermal, wind,
nuclear, to name a few. To establish cri
teria to evaluate these sources we need to
examine our goal.
This is to substitute
domestic energy supplies, immediately and
substantially, for the oil we now import
and for the gas which we will need to im
port. So to be a useful energy source in
these terms we require 1 ) that the source
be available in sufficient quantity to meet
the projected demand or a substantial frac
tion of it, 2) that the source be available
for exploitation with developed technology,
and 3) that the cost of utilizing the
source be acceptable to society.

A reasonably pessimistic energy scenario
is illustrated in Figure 1 which includes
both a projected energy demand and a pro
jected energy deficit up to the year 2010.
The projected total energy consumption is
based on a 3% annual growth rate taking
total consumption in 1970 as the starting
point.
This growth rate is a concensus
of published projections (2) and is in
good accord with historical growth rates
( 3) .
Our projected energy deficit is based on
our concern with achieving energy indepen
dence In the near future.
In these terms
the deficit is simply a prediction of the
shortfall in domestic oil and gas produc
tion. To estimate it we have made a
straightforward projection of present
trends.
We again use 1970 as our base
year at which time our primary energy
sources and their percentage of the total
supply were oil - 42.2%, natural gas 31.9%, coal - 21.5%, and nuclear and hydro
combined - 4.4% (2). We as sume that do
mestic oil and gas production has peaked
in the 1970's and will remain constant
through the period in question, until 2010.
In fact domestic oil production has de
clined 15% from 1970 to 1976 while gas
production has declined 9»5£ during the
same period (4). We assume that for our
40 year horizon domestic oil production
will be 3.3 x 109 bbl/yr and domestic gas
production will be 22,000 TCF/yr. Finally
we assume that the supply mix will not
change or that the other supplies rise at
the 3% demand rate.
It is now a simple matter to calculate the
deficit, or more correctly, the shortfall
28l

When we evaluate our potential sources against these requirements, the options de
crease markedly.
Nuclear fusion, which
many believe represents our best long-term
energy source, is simply not a candidate
for solving the near-term problem.
Scien
tific feasibility has yet to be demon
strated much less the engineering required
to configure a power plant. This technol
ogy is not available. Using current tech
nology geothermal and tidal power, while
attractive in many ways, represent only
locally useful options. Their present
power potential is small although develop
ment of techniques to utilize warm water
and hot, dry reservoirs would greatly in
crease the geothermal potential. Most of
the other options are ruled out by similar
considerations. We believe that only three
possibilities can be considered.
Solar power is an attractive possibility.
The technology is developed and simple;
sunlight is available and the total amount
is more than adequate; the environmental
cost is almost zero. One problem is that
the simple and low cost solar technology,
typified by the flat-plate collector, is
suited to producing warm water or air and
not well adapted to the needs of intensive
energy users such as Industry. Production

of large amounts of power, the amounts
that our projection requires, and produc
tion in form generally useful to society
is a potentiality not an actuality for
solar power.
We do expect that solar pow
er will make a strong growth in the time
period we are considering, but we expect
that its role will be limited to comfort
heating and cooling.
In this regard we do
make one point. One problem which inhib
its the adoption of solar heaters is the
need for an auxiliary heat source. To
think ahead, a low cost means of producing
electricity and the consequent use of such
low cost electricity as the auxiliary heat
source could well speed the adoption of
solar heating and cooling in the residen
tial sector.
We have not included a solar
contribution in our deficit projections in
section 2 since even a total conversion of
heating and cooling requirements to solar
power would not erase the deficit in ques
tion.

Coal Plant
Installed Cost
Fuel

2.90 x 10^ tn/yr

§ $20/tn

$58 x lC6/yr

Operation and
Maintenance

$4.8 x 10^/yr

Electricity Cost

20 mills/kWhe

Nuclear Plant
Installed Cost
Fuel

$1000 x 106

88.75 mt/yr

6 $20/lb

U30g

$3.9 x 106/yr

Operation and

In the final analysis, we believe that
coal and nuclear fission are the only
energy sources available to meet our goal
of near-term energy independence. Both of
these sources can be utilized with devel
oped and available technology. Both are
capable of supplying the entire deficit,
at least for the time period under consid
eration.
And while both have associated
costs, as fuels and in environmental de
gradation, these costs can be minimized
and must simply be borne if we are to achieve energy independence in the near fu
ture .
4.

$850 x 106

Maintenance
Electricity Cost

$3.8 x 106/yr
16 mills/kWhe

The obvious conclusion based on these cal
culations is that the nuclear option is
cheaper.
We caution that these costs are
especially sensitive to the installed
cost assumptions. The relative costs
above reflect the sharp increase in in
stalled cost reported for coal fired
plants (8).
In addition to these costs for electricity
produced by the plants, we must consider
the costs, primarily environmental, asso
ciated with producing, transporting, and
utilizing the fuels. This is not a new
situation and these costs for coal have
been quantitatively evaluated by Morgan
and his co-workers (9)*
We suggest that
in today’s world these environmental costs
and society's perception of them will
largely determine the choice between the
options.

A COMPARISON OF THE COAL
AND NUCLEAR OPTIONS

Extensive discussions of these two options
are available in the literature (5). We
will only summarize some aspects of these
comparisons which we feel bear most di
rectly on the choice between the options.
Since the primary role for these two
sources, indeed the only role for nuclear
power, is to produce electricity, the sim
plest comparison between them is to look
at the cost of the electricity produced.
We will follow Anderson’s method attempt
ing to update the cost figures he used(6).
We will compare plants with an identical
electric capacity, 1000 MWe . We assume
that both plants have an overall efficien
cy of 33 1/3% and operate with an identi
cal plant factor assumed to be 10056. The
annual fixed charges are calculated as
1 3 *5 % of the installed cost.
The opera
ting and maintenance costs have been es
calated from Anderson's figures at 5$.
The annual fuel requirement for the nuc
lear plant comes from Nagel and Cerbone
(7). The electricity cost calculations
are detailed below.

In the area of production and transpor
tation nuclear power owns an advantage
over coal due to the high specific energy
content of uranium used for fission.
In
the extreme case of U^35 versus coal, on,
a weight basis uranium releases 2.5 x 10°
times as much energy as coal.
Rather than
dwell on this extreme case, let us con
sider the land costs for each option. We
will assume that all the excess coal re
quired to satisfy the deficit will be
strip mined.
It seems only reasonable
that a crash coal development program such
as our projections require would rely
heavily on stripping.
We will assume that
the coal deposits yield 1.8 x 10° tn/mi^
(9). We will further assume that the land
can be reclaimed, at least for agricultur282

al purposes, in 3 years. Our model coal
plant which requires 2.9 x 10^ tn/yr of
coal then requires 1.6 mi2/yr of land.
With these assumptions and our projections
we can easily calculate the land lost in
any given year, either being mined or
being reclaimed.
In the year 2C10, assum
ing that all the deficit is supplied by
coal, the land so lost would be approxi
mately 15,000 mi2 . We can perform the
same estimate for our model reactor. We
assume an average ore yield of 1.4 lbs
U^Oy/ton of ore (10). Assume the ore has
a specific gravity of 2.5* Further assume
as a worst case that the ore deposits are
1.5 ft thick and that the mining is open
pit with no reclamation. Then as we did
for coal we can calculate the land requir
ed for fuel production. Since we do not
consider reclamation the land loss is cummulative. Based on our projection and
assuming that the entire deficit is sup
plied by reactors, the cummulative land
loss through 2010 is 1100 mi2. This is a
sizeable amount but this is a worst case
calculation. We ignore the fact that much
of the uranium ore reserve is suited to
underground mining and that even open pit
mines can be reclaimed. Similar calcula
tions emphasize the relative impact of
coal on the transportation sector (11).

In addition to these problems which have
been widely publicized we believe there is
another economic risk associated with the
nuclear power option and indeed any energy
alternative. This is the threat of low
production costs for oil. We have consid
ered coal as a possible power source. We
know that coal was used extensively at one
time but was driven out by low cost oil.
In the same vein, the literature is re
plete with statements of the form ... pro
cess A will be economically competitive
when oil costs $10/bbl ... or whatever.
Although oil now costs $15/bbl, we know
that in the Middle East where reserves are
highest the production costs for oil are
on the order of $0.20/bbl (13)• There is
probably some truth to the statement that
some producers could give oil away for some
time before being economically pinched. If
energy prices were based on production
costs, there is no question that we should
rely on oil for the major fraction of our
energy needs. Anyone who risks capital in
an alternative energy scheme faces the
possibility of being undersold by the oil
producers. This is a real risk and must
be dealt with. A possible solution would
be government protection in the form of
subsidies, or quotas, or tariffs , or some
combination thereof. We believe that such
solutions would be politically unlikely in
the U.S. today.
It is easy to Interpret
such solutions as the government maintain
ing high energy prices for the benefit of
a few private investors. In these terms
we can see the political difficulties.

Finally, in the area of utilization, pub
lished data indicate that the emissions
from a coal fired plant exceed those from
a properly operated nuclear plant by a
significant amount. Nuclear plants emit
no S0X , no N0X , and no particulates, and,
in fact, the data show that a coal fired
plant actually emits more radioactivity
than a properly operated nuclear plant

We believe that the high risks associated
with nuclear power make it an unlikely al
ternative for private investors. We sug
gest that the only way to adequately ex
ploit this power source is to have govern
ment ownership of the reactors. We propose
the formation of a government agency, a
Federal Power Authority, whose task would
be to build, to own, and to operate the re
actors. We further propose that its role
stop with these tasks. Many areas are ade
quately served by investor owned utilities.
In these areas the FPA could sell electri
city to the already existing private util
ities to distribute as they saw fit. The
primary role for the government is to as
sume the high risk associated with the
choice of nuclear energy to produce elec
tricity. We note also that we are propos
ing the nuclear option as an emergency
measure. We do not suggest this nuclear
option as a solution to our long-term en
ergy problem. Rather as an emergency mea
sure to carry us over the next few decades.

( 12) .

The key to the analysis in this section is
a phrase contained in the last paragraph,
properly operated plant. Subject to this
reservation, that the nuclear plants are
operating properly, these considerations
make a clear case to us for adopting the
nuclear option to satisfy our near-term
need for a domestic energy source.
5.

A STRATEGY TO UTILIZE NUCLEAR POWER

If nuclear power Is such an attractive op
tion, we then ask why is it not exploited.
The answer, of course, is because of the
potential risks. No one questions the de
structive potential of a nuclear power
station. The nuclear power issue revolves
around the possibility that this potential
will be realized. In some eyes the risk
Is unacceptably large. And in today's
world a few such people can delay reactor
construction for long periods and in some
cases halt it. The uncertainty and de
layed start-up time associated with this
problem appear as higher installed costs.

What are the advantages of government own
ership that justify such an excursion into
the economy? Let us begin by looking at
the technical risk. As we know this risk
is connected with containment, the need to
283

absolutely isolate the radioactive fuels
and wastes. One of the major containment
failures and one which has received much
attention is the LOCA event. We believe
that the probability of this event is in
dependent of ownership, assuming reason
able levels of responsibility.
Only a
random and highly improbable physical ac
cident or direct human intervention, sabo
tage, seems likely to initiate LOCA. We
see no way to correlate the probability of
such an event with ownership of the reac
tor .

cilitate training of the operating staff.
The continued use of a single system would
also provide added experience in its eccen
tricities and hopefully generate a learning
curve related to its malfunctions. This
experience could be utilized in simulators
to provide continual upgrading of the oper
ating personnel enhancing the safety mar
gins .

With respect to storage of the wastes, we
accept the fact that no one can guarantee
storage for 10° years with today's tech
nology. But the government has storage
responsibility for radioactive wastes re
gardless of who produces them. Whether
the government owns the reactor or not has
no bearing on the storage problem. We can,
however, look at the magnitude of the
problem. We assume that our model reactor
produces 62.4 ft3 of solid wastes per year
(14). If we were to satisfy our entire
deficit with nuclear power, we estimate
that by the year 2010 we will have 3 x 10^
ft3 of such wastes, an amount well within
the capacity of current technology to
store.
The technical risk reduction in our FPA
reactor option relates to the fuel cycle.
We have already stated that we envision
the use of these reactors as a temporary
emergency measure. Since we postulate no
long-term fission role we see no need for
fuel reprocessing and recommend against
it. We know that one of the hazards of a
nuclear option is the disposition of plu
tonium. In itself it is a highly toxic
material and, in addition, it is a weapons
grade material.
If we consign plutonium
to permanent storage along with the other
wastes the hazards associated with it will
be much reduced. The choice of a oncethrough fuel cycle implies a short-term
reactor use. Using our model reactor and
assuming that all the deficit is supplied
by nuclear power, Figure 2 shows the cummulative uranium use as a function of time.
On the same figure we have indicated the
U.S. uranium ore reserves CIO). Clearly
the reactors will not run forever. Such
short-term use is unsuited to private in
vestment where a sufficiently long oper
ating life is required to recoup invest
ment. To utilize reactors for a short
term requires government assumption of the
risk.
One other technical advantage does occur
with government ownership of the reactors.
One buyer, and only the government is big
enough to be the one buyer, should hasten
the adoption of the standard reactor. The
use of a single operating system would fa
284

With the introduction of the standard re
actor concept we enter the area of economic
advantages we gain with our FPA plan. If
nothing else the standard reactor should be
cheaper than our current models. In fact,
savings of 10% in installed costs have been
predicted (15)* While nothing prevents the
private utilities from subscribing to the
standard reactor design, ownership of all
the reactors by a single agency should fa
cilitate it.
In addition, ownership of all the reactor
installations by a single government agency
will facilitate long-term planning. A 1000
MWg represents a considerable cost in dol
lars, in men, and in material (16). A
building program of the size needed to ap
preciably reduce our projected dependence
on foreign energy supplies would have a
significant domestic impact. In dollars
alone, one could be talking about a yearly
commitment of 100 x lo". The ability of
the government to assume such a large fi
nancial burden and so to commit itself for
a large number of reactors should allow for
long-term planning and scheduling which
will ease the impact. This long-term
scheduling and planning should also permit
significant economies in the development
program above and beyond those associated
with the standard reactor.
Finally, and most important, the government
is best suited to undertake the special
risk associated with the short-term reactor
use we envision. We do not see nuclear
fission as the long-term solution to our
energy problems. Within the next few de
cades we expect the other alternatives now
under development to begin assuming a major
role in supplying our energy needs. As
soon as it is practical, we would recommend
that the reactors be decommissioned.
It
would be unreasonable to ask private utili
ties to invest the large sums required with
the prospect of not utilizing the instal
lations imminent. We can even take this
argument one step further. We have al
ready noted the risk of cheap oil which
overhangs alternative energy developments.
Suppose oil prices drop to the point where
it again becomes the cheapest fuel to pro
duce electricity. Then by all means use
it. Shut the reactors down. The govern
ment can, in fact, build the reactors and
hold them out of operation indefinitely,
using them to provide a ceiling on oil

prices. This is the ultimate safety fea
ture of the FPA option. The risk asso
ciated with a reactor really develops when
it operates. If the reactors are held out
of operation they are relatively harmless.
Only the government has the capability of
using this strategy.

With respect to the specific nuclear pro
gram we are proposing, our recommendations
concern planning. We need to rationally
develop our nuclear capability in concert
with our other domestic supplies to meet
our needs.
Since we need long-term com
mitments to plan rational development, we
need accurate long-term energy projec
tions .

We can also generate a more philosophical
justification for the government interven
tion we are proposing. Energy indepen
dence is a national goal.
We do not seek
energy independence for purely economic
reasons. We wish to be independent be
cause we do not want foreign policy deci
sions held hostage byforeign energy sup
pliers. We wish to be independent because
we do not care to risk arbitrary actions
on the part of a few foreign suppliers.
In purely economic terms, costs, both coal
and nuclear power represent poor ways to
satisfy our energy requirements. The fig
ures favor oil.
If we opt to take the
high risk nuclear approach to supply our
energy needs as a national goal, who
should take the risk? All of us! The
government represents us equally so we
share the risk equally. The benefits come
to society at large so let society assume
the risk.
6.

We also need to investigate methods of fi
nancing the reactor development our projec
tion requires.
Should additional funds be
extracted from the private sector by taxa
tion or can they be transfered from other
programs. The amounts involved are large
but not in context. If we do nothing and
simply continue to import oil to satisfy
our energy needs, we have projected im
ports of 11.8 x 1C)9 bbl of oil in 2010.
At $15/bbl, approximately $17.7 x 10^ will
be transfered to the oil producing na
tions. If the government levies a tax of
$5/bbl on imported oil, $59 x 109 will be
transfered to the government. These too
are large amounts.
7•
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